Goal-independent central banks [electronic resource] : why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.

By: Crowe, ChristopherContributor(s): ProQuest (Firm)Material type: TextTextSeries: IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.Publication details: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006Description: 41 pSubject(s): Banks and banking, Central | Monetary policyGenre/Form: Electronic books.LOC classification: HG1811 | .C76 2006Online resources: Click to View
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"November 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

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