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Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /

Crowe, Christopher.

Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate / [electronic resource] : prepared by Christopher Crowe. - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006. - 41 p. - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256 . - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256. .

"November 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

Subjects--Topical Terms:
Banks and banking, Central.
Monetary policy.

Index Terms--Genre/Form:
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: HG1811 / .C76 2006

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