Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt / Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines.

By: Stehn, Sven JariContributor(s): Vines, DavidMaterial type: TextTextSeries: IMF working paper ; WP/08/164Publisher: [Washington, District of Columbia] : International Monetary Fund, 2008Copyright date: 2008Description: 1 online resource (40 pages) : illustrations (some color)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceSubject(s): Expenditures, Public -- Econometric models | Fiscal policy -- Econometric models | Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models | Debts, Public -- Econometric models | Monetary policy -- Econometric modelsGenre/Form: Electronic books.DDC classification: 336.39 LOC classification: HJ7461 | .S744 2008Online resources: Click to View
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Description based on online resource; title from PDF front page (ebrary, viewed February 26, 2014).

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

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