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Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt /

Stehn, Sven Jari.

Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt / Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines. - 1 online resource (40 pages) : illustrations (some color). - IMF working paper ; WP/08/164 .

Includes bibliographical references.

Subjects--Topical Terms:
Expenditures, Public--Econometric models.
Fiscal policy--Econometric models.
Banks and banking, Central--Econometric models.
Debts, Public--Econometric models.
Monetary policy--Econometric models.

Index Terms--Genre/Form:
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: HJ7461 / .S744 2008

Dewey Class. No.: 336.39

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