000 | 05534nam a22003973i 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | EBC30604787 | ||
003 | MiAaPQ | ||
005 | 20240122002119.0 | ||
006 | m o d | | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 231124s2023 xx o ||||0 eng d | ||
020 |
_a9781805111238 _q(electronic bk.) |
||
035 | _a(MiAaPQ)EBC30604787 | ||
035 | _a(Au-PeEL)EBL30604787 | ||
035 | _a(OCoLC)1402819582 | ||
040 |
_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ |
||
100 | 1 | _aOsborne, Martin J. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aModels in Microeconomic Theory : _bExpanded Second Edition (She). |
250 | _a1st ed. | ||
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge, UK : _bOpen Book Publishers, _c2023. |
|
264 | 4 | _c�2023. | |
300 | _a1 online resource (382 pages) | ||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
505 | 0 | _aIntro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model. | |
505 | 8 | _a10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism. | |
505 | 8 | _aProblems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index. | |
588 | _aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. | ||
590 | _aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. | ||
655 | 4 | _aElectronic books. | |
700 | 1 | _aRubinstein, Ariel. | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _aOsborne, Martin J. _tModels in Microeconomic Theory _dCambridge, UK : Open Book Publishers,c2023 |
797 | 2 | _aProQuest (Firm) | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bacm-ebooks/detail.action?docID=30604787 _zClick to View |
999 |
_c316347 _d316347 |