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020 _a9789087227234
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020 _z9789087227210
035 _a(MiAaPQ)EBC6727096
035 _a(Au-PeEL)EBL6727096
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_epn
_cMiAaPQ
_dMiAaPQ
050 4 _aK4475 .A77 2021
100 1 _aFerreira, Vanessa Arruda.
245 1 4 _aThe Improper Use of Tax Treaties by Contracting States Tax Treaty Dodging (IBFD Doctoral Series Volume 60).
250 _a1st ed.
264 1 _aAmsterdam :
_bIBFD Publications USA, Incorporated,
_c2021.
264 4 _c�2021.
300 _a1 online resource (357 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aIBFD Doctoral Series ;
_vv.60
505 0 _aCover -- IBFD Doctoral Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abstract -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Aim and scope of the study -- 1.2. Relevance and originality of the study -- 1.3. Research question -- 1.4. Methodology -- 1.5. Structure of the book -- Part 1: The Phenomenon of Tax Treaty Dodging -- Chapter 2: The Genesis of the Phenomenon -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The origins of the phenomenon -- 2.2.1. The need for a subtle "backdoor" alternative for opportunistic countries -- 2.2.2. Tax treaty dodging as a subtle backdoor solution -- 2.3. Observation of the phenomenon throughout the decades: A historic study of the literature -- 2.3.1. The 1960s and 1970s -- 2.3.2. The 1980s -- 2.3.3. The 1990s -- 2.3.4. The 2000s and 2010s -- 2.3.5. What now? -- 2.4. The reason for labelling the phenomenon the "improper use of tax treaties by contracting states: tax treaty dodging" -- 2.5. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 3: A Phenomenology: The Functioning of Tax Treaty Dodging -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. The conditions for the phenomenon: An open door to tax treaty dodging practices -- 3.2.1. Tax treaty gaps (as first condition) -- 3.2.1.1. State sovereignty limited by customary international law and self-imposed unilateral limitations -- 3.2.1.2. State sovereignty and the text of tax treaties -- 3.2.1.3. Exercising sovereign rights within the treaty gaps -- 3.2.2. Ambulatory interpretation (as second condition) -- 3.3. Types of tax treaty dodging -- 3.3.1. Legislative dodging -- 3.3.1.1. Redetermination of the constitutive elements of taxliability (as first legislative dodging method) -- 3.3.1.1.1. Reattribution of income -- 3.3.1.1.2. Redesign and creation of taxes -- 3.3.1.1.3. Change of tax rates -- 3.3.1.1.4. Exit taxes on substantial shareholding -- 3.3.1.1.5. Foreign tax credits.
505 8 _a3.3.1.2. Redefining undefined treaty terms (as second legislative dodging method) -- 3.3.1.2.1. Scope of the method: Actions in line with the context in article 3(2) -- 3.3.1.2.2. Residence -- 3.3.1.2.3. Immovable property -- 3.3.1.2.4. Dividends -- 3.3.1.2.5. Interest -- 3.3.1.2.6. Employment and pension income -- 3.3.1.3. Legislative omission: Treaty underride (as third legislative dodging method) -- 3.3.2. Executive dodging -- 3.3.2.1. Passive dodging: Tolerating treaty shopping schemes -- 3.3.2.2. Dodging through public-private agreements -- 3.3.2.3. Executive interpretative dodging -- 3.3.2.3.1. Brazil -- 3.3.2.3.2. France -- 3.3.2.3.3. China -- 3.3.2.3.4. Australia -- 3.3.3. Judicial dodging? -- 3.4. Effects of tax treaty dodging -- 3.5. Concluding remarks -- Part 2: The Legal Assessment of Tax Treaty Dodging -- Chapter 4: Tax Treaty Dodging from the Perspective of International Law -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Tax treaty dodging as an illegitimate act -- 4.2.1. The principles of treaty interpretation in international law as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.2. The principle of good faith as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.3. The principle prohibiting the abuse of rights as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.4. The principle of reciprocity as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.5. Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.6. Taxpayers' fundamental rights as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.7. Bilateral investment treaties as a limitation to tax treaty dodging -- 4.2.8. Answer to the first part of the research question -- 4.3. Tax treaty dodging versus the legitimate exercise of rights: The dividing line -- 4.3.1. Elements of the principles of treaty interpretation in international law -- 4.3.1.1. Good faith.
505 8 _a4.3.1.2. Context -- 4.3.1.3. Subsequent agreements -- 4.3.1.4. Subsequent practice -- 4.3.1.5. Reciprocity -- 4.3.1.6. Object and purpose -- 4.3.1.7. Supplementary means of interpretation -- 4.3.2. Honesty, reasonableness, fairness and malicious intent as elements of the principle of good faith -- 4.3.3. Reciprocity -- 4.3.4. Excessive tax burden as an element of taxpayers' fundamental rights and expropriation clauses in bilateral investment treaties -- 4.3.5. Legitimate expectations as an element of the principle of good faith, article 18 of the Vienna Convention and bilateral investment treaties -- 4.3.6. Answer to the research sub-question -- 4.4. Tax treaty dodging versus direct violation of the wording of tax treaties -- 4.4.1. The origins of the discussions: The Melford case (1982) -- 4.4.2. Beyond Melford (1982) -- 4.5. Concluding remarks -- Part 3: The Way Forward: Addressing Tax Treaty Dodging -- Chapter 5: Available Measures -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Measures available to contracting states -- 5.2.1. Official protest by the offended state -- 5.2.1.1. Avoiding the effects of acquiescence -- 5.2.1.2. Avoiding the effects of subsequent practice -- 5.2.2. Mutual agreement procedure -- 5.2.3. Termination or suspension on the basis of the Vienna Convention -- 5.2.3.1. Termination or suspension of a treaty as a consequence of its material breach -- 5.2.3.2. Termination or withdrawal as a consequence of a fundamental change of circumstances -- 5.2.4. Termination on the basis of article 32 of the OECD Model (2017) -- 5.2.5. The ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (and bringing a claim before the International Court of Justice) -- 5.2.6. Bringing a claim before the court of the offending state -- 5.2.7. Unilateral measures: Countermeasures and retorsion -- 5.2.8. Static interpretation.
505 8 _a5.2.9. Tax treaty provisions addressing later changes in domestic law -- 5.3. Measures available to taxpayers -- 5.3.1. Mutual agreement procedure and arbitration (offered under tax treaties and bilateral investment treaties) -- 5.3.2. Bringing a claim before an international tribunal -- 5.3.3. Bringing a claim before the courts of a contracting state -- 5.4. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations -- 6.1. Conclusion -- 6.2. Recommendations -- References -- Other Titles in the IBFD Doctoral Series.
520 _aThis book examines the methods used by states to modify the outcome of tax treaties and presents ways to better address this phenomenon.
588 _aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590 _aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650 0 _aDouble taxation--Treaties.
650 0 _aTaxation--Law and legislation--Interpretation and construction.
650 0 _aFiscal policy.
655 4 _aElectronic books.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aFerreira, Vanessa Arruda
_tThe Improper Use of Tax Treaties by Contracting States Tax Treaty Dodging (IBFD Doctoral Series Volume 60)
_dAmsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated,c2021
_z9789087227210
797 2 _aProQuest (Firm)
830 0 _aIBFD Doctoral Series
856 4 0 _uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bacm-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6727096
_zClick to View
999 _c308191
_d308191