The role of intelligence in ending the War in Bosnia in 1995 / edited by Timothy R. Walton.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Foreword: Navigating from war to peace: enduring challenges for presidents and citizens / Jonathan R. Alger -- The historical and bureaucratic context of the declassified documents / Timothy R. Walton -- Beyond Bosnia: ethnical reasoning in political deliberations about humanitarian intervention / Pia Antolic-Piper, William Hawk, David McGraw, and Mark Piper -- New lessons from the War in Bosnia: an analysis using computational methods / Anamaria Berea -- Conflict frames and the timing of U.S. intervention in Bosnia / John Hulsey and John A. Scherpereel -- Analytic intelligence and bosnia policymaking in the Clinton Administration / Steven L. Burg -- Explaining U.S. foreign policy toward Bosnia, 1993-95: national identity, credibility, and the "stalemate machine" / Bernd Kaussler, Jonathan Keller, and Yi Edward Yang -- Towards a new social memory of the Bosnian genocide: countering al-Qaeda's radicalization myth with the CIA "Bosnia, intelligence, and the Clinton presidency" archive / Frances Flannery -- The impact of intelligence on DOD perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict, 1995 / Jonathan Smith -- Fallen off the priority list: was Srebrenica an intelligence failure? / Bob De Graaff and Cees Wiebes -- The compromises necessary to get the final deal / Timothy R. Walton.
Description based on print version record.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
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