Crowe, Christopher. <br/><br/>
Goal-independent central banks  why politicians decide to delegate /  [electronic resource] : 
prepared by Christopher Crowe. 
 - [Washington, D.C.] :  International Monetary Fund,  2006. 
 - 41 p. 
 - IMF working paper ;  WP/06/256 .
 - IMF working paper ;  WP/06/256. .
<br/><br/> "November 2006." 
<br/><br/>Includes bibliographical references. 
<br/><br/><br/>Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries. 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Banks and banking, Central.<br/>Monetary policy.
<br/><br/><label>Index Terms--Genre/Form: </label><br/>Electronic books.
<br/><br/><label>LC Class. No.: </label>HG1811  / .C76 2006