What transparency can do when incentives fail [electronic resource] : an analysis of rent capture / prepared by Era Dabla-Norris and Elisabeth Paul.
Material type: TextSeries: IMF working paper ; WP/06/146.Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., c2006Description: 33 p. : illSubject(s): Corruption -- Developing countries -- Prevention -- Econometric models | Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models | Transparency in government -- Econometric modelsGenre/Form: Electronic books.LOC classification: JC598 | .D33 2006Online resources: Click to ViewNo physical items for this record
"June 2006."
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
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